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THE MORAL

10

RESPONSIBILITIES
OF UNIVERSITIES
Terrance Sandalow

IN THE YEARS SINCE the Second World War, "higher education"
has emerged as one of the major influences in American life. Well
over 50 percent of the age cohort now in its teens or early twenties
will attend a college or university, more than a five-fold increase from
the prewar period. Moreover, colleges and universities now engage in
so broad a range of activities that the appellation "higher education"
no longer seems entirely appropriate to describe the institutions. Community colleges, but also four-year colleges and universities, play a
major role in training individuals for skilled and semiskilled occupations. Universities are our most important centers of research, and
they have become so, significantly, at a time of unprecedented societal
dependence on research. They are major providers of medical care.
Their faculty members figure prominently as experts for government,
industry, and the media; and their athletic teams are important sources
of mass entertainment.
The list might be extended, but the point is clear enough. Higher
education has become what in a different setting we call a
"conglomerate," and a very large one at that. It employs over two
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million men and women, its annual expenditures exceed $100 billion, and its total assets approach $200 billion. To be sure, the system
of higher education is highly decentralized and diverse, so that it is
often misleading to think of it in aggregate terms, but even individual
institutions have achieved considerable size and wealth. The largest
have annual budgets that exceed one billion dollars, assets totaling
several times that amount, and employment rolls that number in the
tens of thousands.
The question we have been asked to consider-the appropriate role
of universities in forming a social morality-arises almost inevitably
from the growing importance of higher education in our national
life. Influence carries with it an expectation of responsibility, and an
institution as influential as the American system of higher education
might well be thought to have some responsibility for addressing
pervasive social issues. The widespread belief that our national moral
life is in need of repair thus seems to lead naturally to questions about
the contribution higher education should make to the process of moral
renewal.

I
Although universities are in many respects distinctive institutions,
the question of their appropriate role in forming a social morality is
an aspect of a larger problem that our society has not satisfactorily
addressed, though it presses on us more and more insistently. How
are we to think about the moral responsibility of institutions? It is a
commonplace that we live in an age of large organizations, an age in
which the pursuit of our goals requires collective action on a large
scale. Automobiles cannot be built, nor the next generation educated,
by individuals acting alone or in small groups. And so, large organizations are established to perform these and many other important
functions. Yet, we lack an intellectual framework for thinking about
the moral responsibilities of these organizations. Our ideas about
moral responsibility have been formed in reference to individuals.
Because those ideas presuppose understanding and will- distinctively
human characteristics-they cannot readily be transferred to institutions. Nor is that the only difficulty. The collective exercise of power
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poses troublesome issues that are not raised when power is exercised
by individuals. Institutions are formed to achieve limited objectives,
and the authority conferred on those who direct them is circumscribed by those objectives. The attempt to ascribe moral responsibility to institutions thus raises issues of fiduciary obligation and the use
of delegated power that ordinarily need not be confronted when a
question is raised about the moral responsibility of individuals.
An illustration will help to reveal the difficulty of those issues. A
few years ago a great national debate occurred about whether American corporations should cease doing business in South Africa. Proponents of disinvestment maintained that, by continuing to do business
there, corporations were helping to maintain a brutal and racist
regime. Opponents rested mainly on the contention that disinvestment would seriously harm South Africa's black population and
deprive American business of whatever influence it might have in
bringing about an end to apartheid. A quite different reason for
opposing disinvestment is suggested by an argument Milton Friedman has made against the claim that corporations have social responsibilities beyond their obligations to shareholders to maximize
profits.' If corporations have other social obligations, he asks, how are
corporate officers to know what they are? The power the officers have
been given has been conferred on the understanding that it would be
employed in the interest of shareholders-not, moreover, in the latter's
general interest, but in the service of their limited interest in profit
maximization. No one has authorized corporate officers to decide
what the public interest requires or what burdens they can justifiably
impose on shareholders in promoting interests other than the latter's
interest in profits.
Friedman's argument has great force, but it does not satisfactorily
resolve the problem of corporate social responsibility. Most economic
activity is now carried on by corporations. The consequence of accepting Friedman's argument would thus be to free the largest part of our
economic life from the moral judgments that we would expect to
inform and constrain the same activities if they were undertaken by
individuals. Were mM owned by an individual, no one would suppose that his decision whether or not to do business in South Africa
should rest solely on an inquiry into the profitability of the activity. 2
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Yet, on Professor Friedman's argument, precisely that outcome is
required if the activity is conducted by a corporation. His only
response to this difficulty is to point to the power of government to
prohibit economic activities that are regarded as socially undesirable.
The wisdom of relying exclusively on law to mark out the limits of
socially acceptable economic activity is, however, very doubtful. Individuals do not generally regard themselves as having satisfied their
moral obligations merely because they have complied with the law,
nor does it seem socially desirable that they should do so. The limits
of what we seek to achieve by law are not coextensive with our moral
ideas, in part because government lacks power to intrude into our
lives in sufficient depth and in part because we do not wish it to have
such power. Similar considerations argue against exclusive reliance on
law to limit corporations' profit-seeking activities.
Although Professor Friedman's conclusion respecting the boundaries of corporate social responsibility is unsatisfactory, the force of
his argument needs to be recognized. It too rests on moral claims. In
the first instance, there is the claim of shareholders that the power
they have conferred for a limited purpose should not be employed for
other purposes. Ultimately, however, Friedman's argument rests on
an even more fundamental moral claim, one that involves the adverse
economic consequences of permitting investment in corporations only
on the understanding that they may be employed to pursue whatever
objectives are regarded as morally appropriate by those who control
them. The considerations that incline us against Friedman's argument
do not answer these claims. They merely demonstrate that the problem is more difficult than his argument recognizes. The officers of a
corporation are not and should not be free to manage its affairs on the
same moral principles that would guide them if the corporation were
theirs, but neither should they take the law as their exclusive moral
guide. It is more difficult to say what they should do. Despite the
importance of corporations in our economic life, we have not yet
found a satisfactory way to address that question.
Universities are not profit-making enterprises, but as they go about
their activities, issues are recurrently raised that are very similar to
those presented by the question of corporate social responsibility.
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They too have been established for limited purposes, and the authority conferred on those who control them is limited accordingly. By
what right can the latter employ that power for other purposes? And
yet, it is true of universities no less than of corporations that the
single-minded pursuit of the limited purposes for which they are established would free an important part of our social life from the moral
judgments that should inform it. Recent history suggests the range
and importance of the issues affected by this dilemma. The disinvestment question that has been so divisive an issue in many universities is
nearly identical with that faced by corporations: Should a university
sell its holdings in companies doing business in South Africa even
though that would reduce the value of its endowment, or would
doing so break faith both with donors who understood that their
gifts would be used for educational purposes and with the intended
beneficiaries of those gifts? Should universities accept contracts for
weapons research? Are racial preferences in admission or hiring
morally permissible (or morally required)? Should universities make
their placement facilities available to the CIA and the Department of
Defense? To employers that discriminate against homosexuals?
What are the responsibilities of a college or university to its local
community?
The distinctive characteristics of universities are likely to color the
issues somewhat, but arguments about their moral responsibility that
turn on their institutional character (as distinguished from arguments
based on the nature of the enterprise) are in the main similar for
universities and for corporations. There is, however, one important
difference between the two that merits attention. The locus of authority is a good deal more difficult to locate in universities than in corporations. By law, the directors of a corporation are responsible for its
management. The same is technically true of the trustees or regents of
a university, but the social understanding is very different. Universities are expected to be, and generally are, less hierarchical and less
tightly organized than corporations. Individual faculty members enjoy
considerably greater freedom from institutional control than do the
professional employees of corporations. A chemist employed by a
pharmaceutical company is expected to engage in research that his
superiors have determined to be in the best interests of the company.
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Neither university trustees, nor deans, nor the faculty collectively
would presume to exercise similar control over the research of a
faculty member or the content of his courses. The governing principle, with relatively rare and narrow exceptions, is laissez-faire. How
are we to think about the responsibility of an institution that has so
little control over those who act under its auspices?
When institutional decisions are required, moreover, authority is a
good deal more diffuse in universities than in corporations. Members
of the faculty are technically employees, but tradition accords them a
role in the governance of the institution very different from that of
corporate employees. Students might conceivably be likened to the
customers of a business, but the reality is plainly otherwise. They are
more nearly like members of a community, entitled (in uncertain
measure) to participate in its decisions. Trustees, administrators, and
alumni also have claims to membership in the community and, therefore, a claim to participate in its governance. Although tradition
accords different degrees of responsibility for one or another decision
to one or another group, the understanding is fluid and shifting. Universities are, therefore, likely to be run more by consensus than command, a characteristic that embarrasses still further the task of
ascribing responsibility to them.
Whatever difficulties we may encounter in thinking about institutional responsibility, the appropriate role of universities in forming a
social morality is likely to continue as a subject of concern. The range
and scale of their activities have made their behavior a matter of consequence. The decisions they make-about whom to educate, about
the content and ends of education, about the proper subjects of
research and the priorities among them, and about a host of other
issues-have sufficient moral importance that they must be regarded
as significant elements in any description of the state of our social
morality. Beyond their immediate importance, moreover, the
decisions taken by universities may have a significant effect on the
attitudes and behavior of other institutions and of individuals. The
latter will often be as important as the former, at times even more so.
A university's decision about whether to disinvest in companies doing
business in South Africa is not likely to have a direct effect on the
plight of South Africa's blacks, but it may well help to shape a societal
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understanding about whether injustice in that distant place is an
appropriate concern of Americans. A decision about the use of the
university's placement facilities by employers that discriminate against
homosexuals may or may not affect the employment opportunities of
homosexual students, but it is likely to influence societal judgments
about homosexuality and about whether discrimination against homosexuals is a matter of social concern.
The influence of universities on societal morality helps to explain
why they have in recent years become so prominent a battleground.
Groups making moral claims are likely to see the capture of universities as an important victory, gaining for them a site that is not only
itself an important piece of social territory, but that also offers a
staging ground for pressing their claims elsewhere. The force of their
moral claims has seemed to many an adequate justification for the
effort to turn the university to their purposes. Yet, there is, in E. M.
Forster's phrase, a "morality of morality." The question of how moral
ends should be pursued is itself an important moral question.
The difficulties that we confront in discussing the moral responsibilities of an institution are not merely impediments to a judgment
about whether it can be "blamed" for an action. They are equally
relevant to judgments by those within the institution about the ends
toward which they may appropriately seek to direct it. The trustees of
a university are no more justified than the directors of a corporation
in employing its resources to promote whatever ends they would
regard as morally appropriate were the resources their own. From
time to time, one hears the argument that, whatever limits there may
be on the rightful exercise of power by trustees, the university community as a whole should be free to employ the institution's resources
toward one or another end. Just what is meant by the "community as
a whole" when the "community" is as amorphous as a university is
unclear, but even if that difficulty were overcome, other problems
remain. Collective decision about the moral ends that the university
should serve threatens the diffusion of authority characteristic of
universities, a characteristic that itself rests on important moral considerations. Moreover, the members of the university communityfaculty, students, trustees, donors, and whoever else may have a claim
to membership-have not come together for the purpose of jointly
155 •
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promoting the common good. Their association in the university has
more limited purposes, and it is by no means evident what warrant a
majority, even a very large majority, can claim for employing the
institution for other purposes.
Despite these considerations, it seems inappropriate to conclude
that the members of the university community must refrain from any
effort to bring its activities into line with their moral judgments. That
conclusion would merely elevate the moral concerns on which it rests
to a position of priority over other moral concerns with which they
may at times collide. The priority of the former may at times be
appropriate, but it is not evident that there is any a priori justification
for concluding that they always are. A more discriminating analysis is
required, one that takes account of differences among the issues that
universities confront. A brief essay is not a suitable vehicle for a comprehensive analysis of those issues, but it may be useful to suggest a
number of considerations that should inform the analysis.
At times, as when decisions are made about which students to
admit, a university must speak with a single voice to an issue it cannot
avoid, but that cannot be resolved by reference to the purposes of the
institution. The university's educational responsibility sheds no light
on the question of who is to be educated- whether preference in
admission should be given to applicants with the greatest intellectual
potential, to those who are likely to hold power in later years, or to
the members of disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups. A choice
must be made among these and other possibilities, and if the choice is
to be morally informed, those responsible for it must attend to the
relevant moral issues. There is no apparent reason that others must
refrain from attempting to influence that decision.
More difficult questions are raised when an issue that must be
addressed collectively involves moral concerns that arguably lie outside the province of the university. The disinvestment question offers
a ready illustration. A collective decision about investment policy is
inescapable, but the university's mission does not comprehend concern for all the ramifications of its decisions. The university does not
exist to promote social justice, but to educate its students and to foster
the advancement of knowledge. In performing the latter functions, it
may well contribute to the achievement of social justice, but it does so
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indirectly, by enlarging the capacity of its students and by promoting
the increase of knowledge. The consequence, it might be argued, is
that universities may not appropriately risk the value of their
endowments by refusing to invest in companies that do business in
South Africa.
The difficulty with this formulation of the argument against
disinvestment is that it fails to recognize the need for ethical constraints on the manner in which the university pursues its central
objectives. The need for such constraints is, however, frequently and
properly recognized-for example, in rules designed to protect experimental subjects even at the cost of inhibiting research that would
contribute to the advancement of knowledge. Although the ethical
prescription "do no harm" states too simplistic a standard, it is an
appropriate reminder that we ought to concern ourselves with the
harm that results from our actions. The prescription seems no less
appropriate when power is exercised collectively than when it is
exercised by individuals. Accordingly, if investment in companies
doing business in South Africa contributes to the perpetuation of
injustice, that consequence is a relevant consideration in deciding on a
university investment policy.
Nevertheless, I want to suggest that disinvestment-and hence,the
pressure on universities to disinvest- may well be inappropriate
because it employs the university's influence toward ends that are
beyond the university's purview. The critical question is whether continued investment in companies doing business in South Africa
actively contributes to perpetuation of the regime. If it does, as I have
already argued, that consequence furnishes a legitimate, though
not necessarily a decisive, reason for disinvestment. If it does not,
however, disinvestment seems merely an effort to influence American
public opinion toward South Africa, an aim that lies outside the
purposes for which the university was established. However laudable
the objective, the means chosen involves an appropriation of the
university's influence. To repeat: individuals do not come together in
the university for the purpose of jointly promoting the common good.
Their association is for more limited purposes. To achieve those
purposes, it will often be necessary to recognize that some part of the
community must act in the name of the whole. But those who exer-
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cise that power-and by extension any attempt to influence themought to be constrained by the purposes for which it is granted.
They are not free to employ the resources they control as though
those resources were their own.
We have been considering situations in which an institutional decision is inescapable. In many situations, the university has another
alternative: it may defer to the decisions of individuals. Many of the
most important decisions in the university, especially those involving
its educational and research activities, are made in that way. With
some variation by discipline (and among universities), neither the
educational program nor the research of the faculty is generally taken
as a subject for collective decision. Although a few minimum requirements may be collectively established, the "curriculum" comprises
mainly the aggregation of courses that individual faculty members
wish to teach and the courses that individual students elect from the
resulting smorgasbord. Collective decision about the aim and content
of courses, including collectively prescribed courses, is even less likely.
And even less institutional control is exercised over the faculty's
research. The university thus becomes merely an environment within which individuals may pursue their individual objectives. Its
institutional responsibility is taken to be only that of fostering
conditions that are maximally conducive to the achievement of
those objectives.
Any attempt to impose more particular responsibilities threatens
that view of the university and the decision-making regime on which
it rests. At my own university, for example, some faculty members
and students maintain that no grant or contract for the development
of weapons should be accepted. The argument rests on the claim that
the university should be committed to humane values and that
research that contributes to the destruction of human life is incompatible with such a commitment. If these arguments are taken to define
the moral responsibility of the university, that responsibility can
be met only by limiting the freedom of individual investigators.
Similarly, if universities are to be held responsible for the moral development of their students, the institution- through some collective
decision-making process-will have to assume greater control over
the educational program .
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Resistance to the idea that the university has such responsibilities
is, not surprisingly, often grounded in a defense of the current diffusion of authority. For present purposes, it will be sufficient to characterize these arguments as involving a claim of academic freedom, a
characterization that should bring home that the resistance also rests
on a moral foundation. How the claim of academic freedom should
be weighed against the claim of institutional responsibility is too large
a question to be adequately addressed here, in part because it requires
considerable attention to context. I want to make only one general
observation: the reliance on academic freedom to avoid institutional
responsibility too often ignores the extent to which the circumstances
within which individual decisions are made have been created by
the institution. It is only because the institution exists that a faculty
member has students to teach. A faculty member's research is not
only supported by institutional resources, but may also have been
shaped by institutional expectations regarding research and the means
by which it is to be financed. Institutional expectations regarding
research may also influence decisions about the courses a faculty
member wishes to teach. And students are not generally content to
receive a piece of paper reciting that they have taken specified courses
covering described materials. They want a degree that carries the seal
of the university.
These considerations do not carry us very far in balancing the competing claims of academic freedom and institutional responsibility,
but they do caution against pressing the former too hard. Some
account must be taken of the fact that the decisions are made within
an institution and that their consequences are in some measure
affected by that circumstance. The institution cannot escape responsibility for an individual's actions simply by asserting that they are not
the product of a collective decision. Some responsibility follows from
its having empowered him to act or from its influence on his decision
to act in the way that he has. The ethical principle that requires
disinvestment if continued investment would contribute to the perpetuation of injustice seems equally to require collective safeguards
against, for example, the abuse of students by faculty members. Having set a force in motion, the university is ethically bound to safeguard against harms that may result from its having done so.
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II
This analysis suggests at least some limits on the role that the
university should play in forming a social morality. The university
does not have a roving commission to do good, nor does it have a
mandate to serve as society's conscience. Whatever role it may have
in forming a social morality is to be played out in the performance of
its more limited responsibilities. Those responsibilities, it bears repeating, provide ample scope for significant contributions to the nation's
moral life. The manner in which universities perform their responsibilities is itself an important component of our collective moral life. It
is also a significant influence on the moral understanding and behavior of others. When, for example, universities illegally recruit star
athletes, a lesson is taught to the young that is likely to have moral
consequences far more important than the immediate consequences
of the recruitment.
Despite the range and importance of their other activities, it is in
the performance of their most traditional function, the education of
students, that universities are likely to have the most significant impact
on social morality. Yet, even when attention is directed solely to that
function, the role that universities should play in forming a social
morality is not an issue that one can easily imagine arising until relatively recently. As recently as fifty years ago-surely no more than
seventy-five years ago- their place in the life of the nation was too
peripheral for anyone to suppose that what they did would significantly affect social morality. Colleges and universities were, of course,
expected to attend to the moral development of their students, but
throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth the
percentage of the population attending institutions of higher education, even among the more influential classes, was too small for
the moral life of the nation to be greatly affected by the education
students received.
There are other and in many ways more interesting reasons that
the question is a distinctively modern one. A century ago, it would
have been assumed that a university's responsibility is to transmit
morality. Now we are asked to consider the university's role in forming a social morality. Those are very different conceptions of the
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university's role, and it will be instructive to inquire why we should
be led to consider a conception of the university's role so different
from the one assumed by our grandparents and great-grandparents.
An erosion of moral consensus during the past century might be
thought to offer a partial explanation. Earlier generations were, on
this view, bound together by a common moral understanding. Transmitting that understanding, and inculcating a commitment to it,
might seem an appropriate task of education because the society knew
what it believed and, therefore, what it wanted its children to believe.
With the erosion of consensus there is less certainty about what
should be passed on to the next generation. We are, thus, asked to
consider the university's role in forming a social morality because the
felt need now is for a consensus to be forged from the current welter
of moral understandings and commitments.
The problem with this explanation lies in the difficulty of assessing
the differences between our own and an earlier time. We are acutely
aware of the moral disagreements in our own time, but just as mountain peaks seem to flatten out as they recede, the controversies of an
earlier time lose significance for us as our distance from them
increases. Additional difficulties are posed by the necessity of gauging
not merely the intensity of moral controversies in different periods,
but the relative importance of the controversies in the overall social
fabric. The question of whether there is less moral consensus now
than fifty or a hundred years ago is, therefore, a complex historical
problem that does not admit of answers as simple as those served up
by nostalgia for a dimly perceived past.
The period to which nostalgia tends to be directed is the latter half
of the nineteenth and the early years of the current century. Whether
moral consensus was or was not greater then than now, that time
differed from our own in a number of ways relevant to the question
of why universities in the earlier period might be taken to have
responsibility for transmitting morality while it now seems appropriate to ask about their role in forming a social morality. Both the
student bodies and the faculties of colleges and universities were a
good deal more homogeneous then than now. The composition of
both was restricted by race, ethnic group, class, religion, and sex.
Homogeneity was enhanced by the local character of all institutions
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and by the sectarian affiliation of many of them. Whatever differences
there may have been in the larger society were, accordingly, considerably softened by the similarity of background and resulting similarity
of outlook among the members of a particular college or university
community. The notion that universities are charged with transmitting morality to the next generation fits much more easily into such
an environment than it fits into the vastly different setting of contemporary higher education.
Changing conceptions of morality have also played a part in altering ideas about the university's role. A century ago, morality was
more likely than at present to be thought of as rooted in an external,
generally a religious, source. Contemporary notions about morality
are more likely to regard it as a human construct. The idea that education consists, at least in part, of transmitting morality to students
does not comport well with the latter conception of morality. If
morality is a human construct, the prevailing understanding of it is
always open to question, far more so than if it is thought to be rooted
in an external source. Attention is thus directed away from the transmission of morality toward questions about the wisdom of what has
been constructed. The salience of those questions leads to uncertainty
and controversy about what is to be transmitted.
The idea that education ought to be concerned with transmitting
moral values nonetheless persists and forms the basis for a good deal
of current criticism of universities. The goals of an educational program must, however, take some account of social circumstances, and
it is a fair question whether the goals of the critics adequately take
account of the circumstances of our society.
The contemporary conception of morality as a human construct is
reinforced by a contemporary tendency to regard prevailing social
and economic structures as a subject of choice. Increasingly, those
structures are not considered fixed, defining boundaries within which
individual decisions must be made, but are themselves thought of as
created by humans and, therefore, alterable by them. The ethic of
individual responsibility that universities sought to transmit to students in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries does not fit
comfortably into this intellectual framework. The reason is not that
issues of personal responsibility no longer seem important to us, but
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that they have come to seem less important than issues of social and
economic organization. The latter are no less moral issues than the
former, but they are also political issues. At stake in the controversies
over their resolution is the distribution of status, wealth, and power.
Universities cannot undertake to transmit "answers" to most such
issues if for no other reason than because our society has none to
offer. In the absence of consensus and with the loss of faith in an
external source of moral judgment, any effort by universities to inculcate their students with "answers" will seem merely a partisan
response.
The political character of the moral issues made salient by contemporary ways of thinking about morality is, however, only one of the
difficulties that a contemporary university would face were it to view
its task as that of transmitting morality to its students. Earlier, I contrasted an older conception of morality, one resting on external
sources and emphasizing an ethic of individual responsibility, with a
modern conception that regards morality as a human construct and
that gives more emphasis to social and economic institutions than to
individual responsibility. But the characterization of the former as
"older" does not mean that it is no longer current. Contemporary
Americans tend to hold both conceptions simultaneously, though the
extent to which reliance is placed on one or the other differs widely in
different parts of the population.
The belief is widespread that universities have failed to attend
adequately to the moral development of their students, but one consequence of the moral divisions among us is disagreement about just
where universities have failed. At the risk of caricature, the critics
may be divided into two main camps: a "conservative" camp that
deplores mainly the failure of universities to instill students with an
ethic of individual responsibility, and a "liberal" camp that is primarily critical of the universities' failure to inculcate a commitment
to work toward social changes that will remedy various social and
economic ills. The use of political labels to describe moral and educational positions seems appropriate in this instance because, perhaps
not surprisingly, there is some correspondence between each camp's
political agenda and what it perceives as the failing of higher
education.
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Drug use, violence, a lack of respect for authority, and declining
standards of honesty and sexual morality rank high on the
conservatives' list of pressing social problems. All are attributed in
some measure to the failure of universities and other educational
institutions to aid their students in developing an appropriate set of
personal values. Not all of these problems are regarded as such by
liberals, but even when they are, the remedies offered by liberals are
likely to be quite different from those proposed by conservatives. The
remedy proposed by the latter is implicit in their views about the
source of the problems: universities should lead their students to an
understanding of the importance of certain personal values, an understanding that would, if generally held, almost definitionally eliminate
the problems. Liberals are more likely to attribute the problems to
very different causes and, as a consequence, to offer very different
remedies. Violence, they are likely to believe, is rooted in poverty and
dishonesty among students attributable to the overwhelming pressure
of current educational practices. The remedy, thus, is to eliminate
poverty and reduce the pressure on students. The frequency of that
response is itself likely to be taken by conservatives as a symptom of
moral decay and probably also as a cause of it.
In any event, the liberal critics of higher education regard racism,
pollution, the persistence of poverty, and the threat of war as far
more serious moral problems than those emphasized by conservatives. Just as the conservative critics tend to look back with nostalgia
to the nineteenth century, the liberal critics also have fond memories
of a "golden age"- in their case the 1960s. The moral development
at which education should aim, in their view, is an awakening
of the remembered spirit of that time in each generation of students.
Conservatives tend to reject that view on the ground that it politicizes the educational process, an objection that liberals counter with
the assertion that the quiescence produced by an ethic of individual
responsibility is no less political. An education that emphasizes that
ethic, the latter maintain, diverts attention from the most serious
moral problems that our society confronts; worse, it leads students to
hold individuals responsible for problems that are socially created and
can be addressed only by an acceptance of social responsibility.
Although they are admittedly caricatures, these broad-brush de• 164
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scriptions suggest the difficulties that the contemporary university
would encounter were it to adopt either view. The moral development at which each camp aims is a stance toward life. A university
cannot inculcate the attitudes and values that either regards as
appropriate merely by requiring students to register for a prescribed
course, as it might if the task were only to assure that every graduate
understands trigonometry or is acquainted with a set of ethical precepts. If the university is to be held responsible for the moral development of students, as moral development is understood by both
conservative and liberal critics, a pervasive commitment to that end
will be required. Moral values permeate the curriculum- indeed,
all of the relationships that the university has with its students. To
discharge its responsibility, the university would be required to act
collectively to assure that appropriate use is made of all the opportunities thus presented.
Collective decision would also be required about the moral views
to be instilled in students. By whom is that decision to be made?
In a relatively few institutions, generally those with close ties to a
religious denomination, the question is not very difficult. Hierarchical relationships within the denomination or the shared moral perspectives of students and faculty furnish a sufficient answer. For most
universities, the question will be more difficult, perhaps unanswerable. Their faculties, which traditionally have borne responsibility for
the educational program, are as riven by moral differences as the
general population. Those differences can be accommodated within
the prevailing regime of laissez-faire, but that solution is ruled out by
a conception of education that calls for inculcating prescribed values.
Perhaps one need not be too concerned about the divisions within
faculties, because it seems unlikely that their authority would continue for very long if they openly sought to inculcate collectively
prescribed moral views. Public acceptance of faculty authority over
the educational program rests in part on a belief in the faculty's expertise. There is little reason to suppose that the public regards the faculty as having a special competence with respect to the great moral
issues that confront the nation. Of course, sophisticated members
of the public appreciate that moral ideas infuse much of what is
taught in universities, but it is one thing to tolerate the freedom of the
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faculty when students are exposed to a multitude of voices, no one of
which is taken to be authoritative, and quite another to do so when
the university speaks with a single voice.
One may doubt also whether universities are capable of achieving
the goals of those who look to them to provide moral guidance to
students. At its best, higher education is a powerful experience-at
times even a transforming one-greatly enhancing the capacities of
students and opening them to wholly new possibilities in thinking
about ways to live a life. It is, nonetheless, only one influence among
many, and it is likely to be least influential in shaping the values of
students. Sectarian institutions that draw their student bodies primarily from a narrow population that share a common outlook must,
once again, be sharply distinguished from other colleges and
universities. The former, like nineteenth-century institutions, are
called upon to reinforce values that hold sway in the community
from which their students come and to which they will return. The
student bodies of most institutions, by contrast, are drawn from
diverse backgrounds, and they anticipate lives in a world characterized by a diversity of values and ethical practices. The connotations
of the phrase "ivory tower" suggest the limited influence of the
university when it seeks to impart values that diverge very markedly
from those that students perceive in the outside world.
In recent years, for example, the organized bar has expressed considerable concern about the ethical behavior of lawyers and their
commitment to professional ideals. The concerns expressed range over
a broad area, from the frequency of dishonesty and lawbreaking by
lawyers to an asserted failure of many lawyers to meet their public
responsibilities. Among the issues raised are some that are highly
controversial, such as the appropriate balance between zealous pursuit
of a client's goals and recognition of public and other interests that
may conflict with those goals. The most tangible consequences of
the bar's avowed concern are a requirement that law schools require
their students to take a course in professional responsibility and an
admonition to faculties to emphasize ethical issues throughout the
curriculum. It is, however, naive to suppose that a course-or even
three years of legal education-will have a decisive influence on the
behavior of most law school graduates. Even if law faculties were of
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one mind regarding the issues-a wildly improbable supposition-too
many other factors are at work that overpower whatever influence
three years of legal education may have.
Students come to law schools as adults. They are a good deal less
malleable than seems to be supposed by those who look to legal education to solve the ethical problems of the profession. To be sure, the
determinants of lawyer behavior are not irrevocably fixed prior to
the first day of law school, but to the extent that the personal
characteristics, attitudes, and values of fledgling lawyers are still being
shaped, lessons learned in law school about the appropriate behavior
of lawyers are, for nearly all students, likely to be much less influential than what they learn from observing the behavior of practicing
lawyers. It should not be surprising that the lawyers encountered in
summer clerkships and in the early years of practice are the models to
whom students and young lawyers look for clues about how they
ought to conduct themselves. After all, it is those lawyers, not the
members of law faculties, who face the questions that students and
young lawyers confront in practice and who lead the lives to which
the latter aspire.

III
The hopes of both conservative and liberal critics misconceive the
aims of higher education and its potential. A pluralist society cannot
accommodate a conception of education that calls for inculcating
controversial moral values. 3 It does not follow that universities have
no role in the moral development of their students. In the remainder
of this essay, I want to sketch briefly some ideas about the contribution universities can make.
At one time, there would have been widespread agreement that, as
Herbert Spencer put it, "education has for its object the formation of
character."4 In the sense that Spencer employed it, the word
"character" is not heard very often these days. So used, it is less likely
to inspire than to evoke a faint smile. The loss of meaning is regrettable, for the word captured an aggregation of qualities that are highly
useful in sustaining a life. A man or woman of character has a moral
code, but he or she also has something more: the personal strengths
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that are necessary to steadfastness of purpose in the face of life's
vicissitudes. Disappointment, embarrassment, boredom, fear, pain,
and temptation are obstacles to the attainment of our goals. They are
also part of the common experience of mankind. Courage, patience,
perseverance, and other qualities that enable us to overcome these
impediments are, for that reason, universally regarded as virtues,
and since they are necessary to the success of any sustained moral
undertaking, their enhancement is a central element of moral
development.
Developing these virtues is a traditional aim of education, one that
deserves greater emphasis than it currently receives in higher education. Colleges and universities are not, to be sure, positioned to play a
decisive role in the formation of their students' characters. Students
come to them as adults or near-adults. The faculty-student ratio
and other demands on the faculty's time tend to preclude a level of
personal contact that might permit faculty members to become an
important personal influence in the lives of their students. Still, the
limited potential of higher education for influencing the development
of character does not justify a conclusion that it is irrelevant to that
development. Character traits like those we are considering are, as
Joseph Schwab has written, "enhanced only by undertaking and
sustaining the actions pertaining to [them] to the point of perceiving
and enjoying the enhanced competence which results."> By availing
themselves of the opportunities they have for leading students to such
actions, universities can strengthen those traits. The opposite is also
true. Inappropriate behavior can help to weaken them.
Several years ago, in a talk concerned with issues in legal education, I urged that faculty inattention to class attendance, preparedness
for class, timely submission of papers, and the like represented missed
opportunities for assisting students to develop desirable character traits
and, worse, probably contributed to their erosion. 6 The following
day, a privately published newsletter carried a prominent faculty
member's critical account of the talk under the headline "Sandalow
Calls For Repression." The lesson, I suppose, is that we live in a time
in which every objective may be regarded as political. Nevertheless,
the virtues I have been considering are not very controversial, and the
effort to develop them does not threaten pluralist values. They are not
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only compatible with but necessary to widely differing visions of
moral responsibility.
In any event, the university's greatest potential for influencing the
moral development of students is in the contribution that it can make
to their intellectual development. Moral judgments are not purely
matters of taste, about which individuals differ as they do when one
prefers tomatoes and another prefers carrots. They depend on knowledge and disciplined thought. Although formal education is but one
influence among many affecting character development, it is in our
society the chief instrument of intellectual development.
Universities thus play an important role in the moral development
of students when they assist the latter in developing the capacity to
think clearly, to identify and articulate premises, and to develop arguments that flow in an orderly fashion from those premises. Enhancing
the ability of students to read, similarly, contributes significandy to
their capacity for informed moral judgment. The ability to capture
meaning from the printed word and to understand the possibilities
and uses of fixity, vagueness, ambiguity, and change in language is
essential to participation in a community of thought that extends
beyond very narrow boundaries of space and time, boundaries that
would otherwise confine moral judgment within personal experience.
Moral judgment is also aided by a number of intellectual virtues
whose development is a central task of higher education. These virtues are best described negatively, as freedom from common hazards
to clear thought-hazards such as self-interest, provincialism of time
and place, overdependence on familiar categories of thought, sentimentality, and an inability to tolerate uncertainty.
Informed moral judgment also depends on knowledge. At the most
elementary level, students need to develop an understanding of the
crucial role of facts in moral judgments. Facts are, however, all around
us, and their significance is not generally self-evident. Some comprehension is also required of the theories that men have developed in an
effort to apprehend the world around them. An informed moral judgment may, thus, depend on familiarity with economics, biology, or
any of the other social or natural sciences. In acquainting its students
with those subjects the university makes an important contribution to
their moral development. The capacity for informed moral judgment
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is, finally, enhanced by familiarity with the ideas that others have had
about moral issues. The study of ethics, literature, law, and other
humanistic disciplines, is, therefore, also important to the moral development of students, not as instruction in morality, but in enlarging
the range of ideas available to students in thinking about moral issues.
The university thus contributes to the moral development of
students even when it seems inattentive to that objective. In attending
to their intellectual development, it contributes also to their moral
development by enhancing their capacity to make moral judgments.
That is not an inconsiderable contribution. My experience may be
atypical, but the young people I have known during a quartercentury as a member of a university faculty have not, in the main,
been morally indifferent. It is tempting to say, rather, that too many
have suffered from a surfeit of morality. The real problem, however,
is not an excess of moral commitment, but the superficiality of their
moral judgments, their intensity of feeling about issues they have
barely considered. They are deeply sensitive to moral issues, but their
education too often seems to have left them ill equipped to judge
those issues, at times even unaware of what is involved in making
a moral judgment. A strengthening of the university's educational
program to overcome these deficiencies would make a far more important contribution to the moral development of these young people
and to our collective moral life than any effort to inculcate students
with a particular conception of morality.
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